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COMMENT:
EXACTLY BACKWARDS:
EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
R. Polk Wagnert
First of all, I want to thank in particular Craig Nard for invit-
ing me to this conference, and to Dan Burk and Mark Lemley for
embarking upon a very interesting project.
I
We meet today in an era of accelerating technological devel-
opment, of the ballooning use of patents as both shields and
swords in the marketplace, and increasing criticism of the courts'
ability to meaningfully deal with these changes. Given this, it
would seem to be the rare and unique patent scholar whose respon-
sive policy prescriptions center around unbounded policy-oriented
judicial interventions into various details of the patent law.
Professors Burk and Lemley, however, are such patent schol-
ars. Their basic premise is that the judiciary-in particular the
Federal Circuit-should embrace and extend a trend towards tech-
nology-specific rules that they argue is a major feature of modem
patent law. That is, they argue that judicially-created technologi-
cal-exceptionalism-in which every technology, every industry,
has its own set of rules and procedures, and in which patents are
evaluated on different bases-will address the challenges of the
current U.S. patent system.
I will make three points in this brief response to their pro-
posal. The first two address Burk and Lemley's descriptive claim
that the patent law is increasingly exhibiting a fundamental tech-
t Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Comments appreciated:
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nological-exceptionalism. That is, I first suggest that this trend is
counterfactual to the reality of the current patent law. Second, I
argue that the trend in fact runs counter to some major trends we
see across the patent law. And finally, I consider the public policy
questions raised by Burk and Lemley's call for judicially-created
technological-exceptionalism, concluding that-even assuming
they are descriptively correct-the dominant approach is exactly
backwards of the one they advocate.
II
First let's look at whether technological-exceptionalism is
counterfactual. An initial problem here is that it's really tough to
figure out what is meant by technology-specific rules.' This is
Professor Janis's point.2 He says: Of course! The patent laws are
unquestionably technology-specific. That's by design. That's the
whole point. The key is, then, to distinguish between two different
versions of technological-specificity. 3  The first I call micro-
exceptionalism, which occurs when the same rules are applied to
different technological facts and yield different results. This is the
normal course of things, the way we think of the patent law: gen-
erally uniform rules, applied to very different technological facts,
mediated by the patent law's ubiquitous "person having ordinary
skill in the art" standard.
Although they fail to address the distinction, Professors Burk
and Lemley discuss a far different form of exceptionalism: macro-
exceptionalism, distinct rules or standards applied to different
technological facts. This version creates not only technologically-
variable results, but also industry-variable results. Professors
Burk and Lemley explicitly claim that biotechnology is different
than software and should be treated differently, and different sorts
of rules and procedures should thus be developed.4 It's important
to understand that this is a vision of a very different sort of patent
law than the micro-exceptionalism that is the conventional under-
standing. One problem with Burk and Lemley's descriptive effort
1 For more extended arguments on this point, see R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Ex-
ceptionalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 367 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003) [hereinafter Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism]; R. Polk Wagner, Of
Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341
(2003) [hereinafter Wagner, Of Patents & Path Dependency].
2 Mark D. Janis, Comment, Equilibrium in a Technology-Specific Patent System, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743,744 (2004).
3 This analytic framework was developed in Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism,
supra note 1, and Wagner, Of Patents & Path Dependency, supra note 1, at 1345-47.
4 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 691, 706 (2004).
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is trying to tease out-when you look at the actual cases-what the
Federal Circuit is doing: Are the judges being macro-
exceptionalists? Are they really trying to do something distinctly
different, or is this the ordinary run of patent law wherein similar
rules are applied to different sets of technological facts to yield
somewhat different results?
The second consideration, which is a very specific and per-
haps the most original proposal Professors Burk and Lemley make,
is to vary the person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA")
in order to adjust the scope of the claim depending on the particu-
lar technology.5 Table 1 below illustrates this.
Table 1
PHOSITA Obviousness Disclosure Scope-Effects Scope- Scope-
Level Standard Standard (obviousness) (disclsuEfe ts(disclosure) (equivalents)
lower
High higher loesih ( hing (needn't narrower broader indeterminate
(easy field) (lots of things disclose as
[software] are obvious) mch)much)
Low lower higher
(hard field) (fewer things (must disclose broader narrower indeterminate
[biotech] are obvious) spespecifically)
The Indeterminate Effects of the PHOSITA Standard
A serious flaw in this proposal is that the variation of the PHO-
SITA standard has, ultimately, indeterminate effects on patent
scope. For example, look to the first row in Table 1 above, where
the PHOSITA standard is high, which means it is a relatively
"easy" field (e.g., software). The obviousness standard will be
somewhat higher, because many things are then obvious in that
field. As a result, the disclosure requirement will be lower. The
scope effects of the obviousness standard in this case will yield
narrower patent claims: Because of the amount of obvious infor-
mation, the claim will have to be narrower to avoid the prior art.
Conversely, the disclosure requirements here will yield broader
claims: The claim can be broader without disclosing the underly-
ing invention quite as much. The scope effects with respect to
equivalence, which under the doctrine combines both these effects,
I d. at 736.
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are indeterminate.6 Whether a high level or low level of ordinary
skill in the art ultimately results in broader or narrower patents
depends on what one thinks about the balance between at least
these three, and perhaps more, factors. Thus the scope effects of
varying the PHOSITA standard are fundamentally indeterminate as
a general matter, and are likely to be impossible to figure out even
on a case-by-case basis. Obviously, one can make assumptions
and try to determine the effects, but I think it is quite troublesome
to do so.
Third, there are several alternative explanations for what is
going on in biotechnology-the field that Burk and Lemley point
to as the primary example of technological-exceptionalism. 7 For
instance, one alternative explanation is that the jurisprudential
dataset is characterized by a very small sample size; there are not
many cases that deal directly with this. Another alternative expla-
nation is judicial consistency. Shockingly, one judge, Judge
Lourie, has authored almost all of the major opinions noted by
Burk and Lemley as relevant to biotechnology; thus, one explana-
tion for the unusual patterns is that Judge Lourie could be a very
consistent judge.
A third alternative explanation is factual error. Perhaps the
Federal Circuit is just wrong-Burk and Lemley note this in their
article, but set it aside as an explanation. 8 The Federal Circuit may
simply be wrong about the ordinary skill in the art level of differ-
ent fields and continue to be wrong.
A fourth alternative explanation is fact-versus-law confusion.
The court, at some point, might have said something that was fac-
tually based on biotechnology, or about computer software, and
now the judges are confused about what is fact and what is law.
For whatever reason, the court may continue to follow this fact
that was put in place a long time ago without changing, such that it
looks like the court is on a macro-exceptionalist mission when, in
fact, it is just confused.
Importantly, however, each of these explanations suggests
that any current exceptionalism is extremely unlikely to persist
(even if it currently exists). It is not at all clear to me, even if you
read the cases exactly as Professors Burk and Lemley do, that one
can determine with any confidence that macro-exceptionalism, as
opposed to micro-exceptionalism, is developing.
6 For further exposition on this point, see Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency, su-
pra note 1, at 1348-50.
7 Professors Burk and Lemley identify biotechnology as the primary example of techno-
logical-exceptionalism. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 691.
8 Id. at 714.
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III
The second major concern I have regarding the Burk/Lemley
thesis is that their argument that technological-specificity is an
emerging trend in the patent law appears directly counter to clear,
verifiable jurisprudential trends at the Federal Circuit.
First, I have done a lot of work recently on claim construc-
tion.9 In their earlier discussions, the judges alluded to some of
that work. The trend that I find suggests clear movement towards
rule-based uniformity, not standards-based disuniformity.
Figure 1
60% ?
20%+
0% *
The Federal Circuit's Trend Towards Rules-Based Claim
Construction 
10
In Figure 1, the y-axis represents the frequency of what I call
the "holistic" methodological approach to claim construction. This
is a largely standards-based (as opposed to rules-based) approach,
whereas the alternative approach-"proceduralism"-is far more
rules-oriented. Figure 1 shows a statistically significant trend over
time of the Federal Circuit becoming more uniformly rules-based.
Second, I am involved in another ongoing project analyzing
all of the Federal Circuit's en banc decisions. It is very interesting
9 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Em-
pirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).1o This chart is simply one chart from a much larger project. See generally id.
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to line up, as I did in Table 2, the last ten years of patent en banc
decisions.
Table 2
Case Year Old Doctrine ew Doctrine Change? UniformiTrend?
Split: disclosed-but- Rule: disclosed-but-
Johnson & unclaimed unclaimed does limit Yes V "
Johnston does/does not limit equivalents
equivalents quIvalents
Rhone-
Poulenc 2002 Case-specific No
Festo 2000 Case-by-case PHE Rule: complete Yes
surrender surrender
Patent-state law Patent-state law
Midwest 1999 conflicts analyzed conflicts analyzed Yes v/
Industries under regional under Federal
circuit law Circuit law
In re Zurko 1998 PTO fact-finding reviewed for clear error No
Split: limited defer- Rule: no deference, Ys V
Cybor 1998 ence to district Rule no deYes
courts pure law issue
Patent-antitrust Patent-antitrust
Nobelpharma 1998 interface decided interface decided Yeaccording to re- according to Fed- Yesgional law eral Circuit law
Hilton-Davis 1995 DOE issues No
Rite-Hite 1995 Patent damages issues No
Split: claim con- Rule: claim con-
Markman 1995 struction as issue struction as issue Yes V/
for judgejury for jury
In re Alappat 1994 PTO procedures/subject matter No
In re
Donaldson 1994 PTO must use 112/6 No
Federal Circuit En Banc Trends
Examination of the cases in which the Federal Circuit court
has either clarified or changed the law reveals that the court is
moving towards uniform rules. Table 2 lists the en banc decisions
in which there is a change-a shift in the doctrinal orientation-
and it demonstrates that the court is moving more towards rules.
Any artifacts Professors Burk and Lemley pick up that suggest the
court is moving away from uniformity would be counter to the ac-
tual evidence of a broader project going on at the Federal Circuit
right now, both in the claim construction area and in a variety of
other areas as seen through the en banc analysis.
[Vol. 54:3
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This type of data-driven project on en banc procedures sug-
gests that the written description requirement is being targeted.
The best predictor, when considering all the patent cases going en
banc, is denials of motions to rehear en banc prior to the case be-
ing taken en banc. Right now we have four judges on record to
take the written description issue en banc. If you look at this,
some of the recent major en banc cases suggest that at some point
this issue is going to be taken en banc. The trend demonstrated in
Table 2 suggests that the Federal Circuit is not heading in the di-
rection that Professors Burk and Lemley want, but in precisely the
opposite direction-towards a more rules-based, uniform ap-
proach.
IV
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to address some policy
arguments. Professors Burk and Lemley make the basic point that
exceptionalism allows for policy-based interventions to ameliorate
(what they consider to be) industry problems in biotechnology-
overlapping rights and transactions costs." Their solution is to
adjust the PHOSITA standard to allow for broader but fewer pat-
ents.1
2
As an initial matter, this argument raises a fatal indeterminacy
problem similar to that which I noted above: Broader patents are
going to spur more patents, not'fewer patents. So it is not clear
how anyone expects achieve the Burk/Lemley goal of fewer pat-
ents while simultaneously broadening their scope. This apparent
logical disconnect alone raises troubling questions.
Second, there are other problems with exceptionalism that
have already been noted to some degree by other commentators,
namely the virtually intractable information and game-playing
problems. We already see this, of course, in patent prosecutors.
Whenever there is a line drawn, rational patent prosecutors want to
straddle it; that strategy gives litigators the most flexibility in the
future. So, because exceptionalism involves the ever more de-
tailed drawing of fine lines, one has to expect an explosion in
game playing.
Third, there are issues concerning the political economy of
specialized patent law. One can imagine the special interest
groups, the political economy issues that will arise once patent law
begins to be disaggregated into all its component parts. Obvi-
ously, this will increase complexity and uncertainty enormously.
" Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 722.
12 This is the Burk/Lemley punch line for biotechnology. Id. at 737.
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Claim construction, for example, is a hard issue. After twenty
years, the Federal Circuit is finally trying to reach some sort of
common set of rules for claim construction. The prospect of hav-
ing to repeat this process for dozens of legal issues in dozens of
different technological areas is a deeply troubling aspect of the
Burk/Lemley proposal.
Finally, note that the Burk/Lemley scheme is a virtually per-
fect indictment of itself. Their argument is that the Federal Cir-
cuit, by creating an exceptionalist biotechnology jurisprudence,
has it exactly backwards: narrow and numerous patents causing
transaction costs. In response, they suggest we ask the Federal
Circuit to engage in even more open-ended, policy-driven excep-
tionalism. Certainly the evidence to date suggests that this is not
something the court is going to do well at all.
Finally, I note that the transaction costs of overlapping rights
are potential problems not at all unique to biotechnology. One
could adopt a different approach-clarify the rights-and go ex-
actly the other direction. Instead of being disaggregated and com-
plex, be simple and clear; the initial allocations matter less. Peo-
ple can, in individual industries, tailor their rights with each other
to deal with these industry-specific issues. A big part of my pro-
posal is the development of uniform, not disaggregated, rules.
Some of the projects I am working on suggest this is what is going
on at the Federal Circuit right now-though of course only in fits
and starts. We are not there yet, and this obviously is not a com-
plete solution. While it may not eliminate costs, it is far more at-
tractive in a sort of second-best world than the exceptionalist ap-
proach. Perhaps most importantly, the suggested solution does not
depend on the Federal Circuit's ability to develop policy, for
which the court does not have a good record thus far.
It may be that the Federal Circuit's trend is in the right direc-
tion and biotechnology jurisprudence is the laggard, not the inno-
vation. In that sense, I would suggest that it is not the Federal Cir-
cuit that has it exactly backwards.
Thank you.
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